Transcendental Idealism and Beyond: Kant’s “Theater of the Mind”

Transcendental Idealism and Beyond: Kant’s “Theater of the Mind”

Que la tyrannie de l’Objet cesse!

Mort a l’Objet! –Vive l’esprit!

Que le reine eternelle de la liberte commence!

No, great man, you who are of such importance for the human race, your work will not perish! It will bear rich fruits. It will give mankind a fresh impetus; it will bring about a total rebirth of man’s first principles, opinions, and ways of thinking. Believe me, there is nothing which will be unaffected by the consequences of your work, and your discoveries have joyous prospects. … Oh great and good man, what must it be like toward the end of one’s earthly life to be able to have such feelings as you can have!  I confess that the thought of your example will always be my guide and will impel me not to retire from the stage before I have been of some use to mankind, to the extent that it lies within my power to be of such use.

 

Fichte to Kant, 9-20-1793[1]

CONTENTS

Introduction.  The Question, Background, Methodology4

 

Chapter OneTRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC

                                    [The “Screen” of The Theater of the Mind]  19

            1.1.  PP1 of The Aesthetic   21

            1.2.  Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space22

            1.3.  Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space25  

            1.4.  “Conclusions from the above Concepts”  26

            1.5.  Transcendental Idealism/Empirical Realism31

            1.6.  Metaphysical and Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time33

            1.7.  “General Observations on Transcendental Aesthetic”  40

 

Chapter TwoTRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE ANALYTIC

                                    [The “Projector” of the Theater]   48

            2.1.  Transcendental Apperception as Absolute Condition49

            2.2.  Transcendental Apperception as the Ground of Objectivity54

            2.3.  The New “Immanent” Critical Notion of an Object60

            2.4. The Schematism, Principles, Refutation of Idealism, and Ground of Phenomena-

                        Noumena Chapter63

 

Chapter ThreeTRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE DIALECTIC

                                    [There is “No Exit” from the Theater]  82

            3.1.  The Paralogisms84

3.2.    The Antinomies101

3.3.    The Ideal110

                        Conclusion111

 

Chapter FourTHE CRITICS: THE TRANSCENDENTAL REALISTS  112

4.1.    H.E. Allison116,  P.F. Strawson137, Walker149, Findlay151, Bohme157,

            Sherover and Srzednicki 156, 306, and Waxman157

            4.2.  Sallis, J.S. Beck, Fichte, and R.P. Wolff159

            4.3.  Common Objections   163

            4.4.  Final Assessment of Kant and His Critics164

 

Chapter Five: BEYOND KANT: TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM A LA FICHTE AND                                                 HEGEL  165

            5.1.  The “Standpoint”: The Difference Between Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel169

5.2.    Transcendental Idealism a la Fichte175

5.3.    Transcendental Idealism a la Hegel185

 

Appendices:  202,  Bibliography:  207

 

Kant’s “Theater of the Mind”

 

 

INTRODUCTION

It is a daring step of reason to liberate mankind to remove it from the terrors of the objective world, but this daring venture cannot fail, because man grows in the measure in which he learns to know himself and his power. In a languid age one cannot expect much progress from a philosophy which asserts as its highest principle that the essence of man consists of freedom and only of freedom, that man is not a thing, not a chattel, and in his very nature no object at all. [1]

 

“Does Or Does Not Kant Hold The Object Of Experience To Exist Independently Of Experience?”

 

            This is the most important question to ask with regard to Kant scholarship today, since the answer one gives to it, I believe, will determine whether or not one has understood Kant’s position - Transcendental Idealism.  Kant’s true position, which it is the burden of this dissertation to show, is that the object of perception/representation as a matter of fact, has no existence independent or distinct from perception/representation, which is to say that it is not a thing “in itself” but rather an “appearance,” or is a thing only for us.  This exactly, I contend, is the singular insight or vision the term “Transcendental Idealism” is intended to communicate.  The opposite position, involving untruth, which takes the object of perception to have an existence in itself and distinct from perception, regarding it in this way as a thing capable of existing in itself or as self-subsistent and not as an appearance, is precisely that of “Transcendental Realism.” 

            In view of the fact that the vast majority of Kant scholars today think it to be Kant’s view that the object really does have an independent existence and, in some cases, that Kant can be read as holding both views, and thus as contradicting himself—as is alleged by P.F. Strawson among others—the importance of the thesis and the problem it engages itself vis-a-vis the contribution it would make to Kant scholarship overall is, I feel, evident.  It will, apart from other things, determine, if its logic is sound, whether one is a Transcendental Realist or a Transcendental Idealist.

            Concerning the scope of the question.  By “object” is meant the object which is given or found in immediate experience and perception or representation, and with the properties it is perceived to possess, i.e. the spatial, temporal, sensory, material or physical, extended object or thing of experience.  The question then concerns whether this object or any of its properties or predicates can be said in any way to exist in themselves or independently or out of relation with or apart from experience or perception/representation/intuition/sensibility.  For example, whether the “cabinet” I am looking at right now or any of its spatial, temporal etc., properties can be said to exist independently or apart from my perception of it; this and not the related question as to whether it can be said to exist when I am not perceiving or representing it - though this subordinate question will also receive treatment by me.  By “object” then is not meant the transcendental object or the “transcendent” thing in itself, the concern is only with the Thing of experience - this hand, pen, book, tree, building, planet, star.  Thus the question can be formulated as follows:  Does the thing as given in experience and which certainly exists for us, also have or “enjoy” an existence apart from us, —Is the thing a thing “in itself”, —Does it possess a self-subsistent existence, or merely an existence or being for us (and in and as experienced),—Or in Kant’s idiom, Is the thing only an appearance or is it a thing in itself, i.e. a thing also capable of existing in and by itself?

            In essence, Transcendental Realism is the position that the object or thing is a thing in itself, i.e. it (or some of its properties) can exist apart, —Transcendental Idealism, the position holding that it cannot, and is thus an appearance only.  It is also important to recognize that this distinction concerns only the object or thing of experience and one’s position concerning the manner of its existence.  It does not at all concern a “transcendent” thing in itself (this term will be clarified presently).  One commits the transcendental realist “blunder,” as Kant makes very clear, only when one mistakes “appearances for things in themselves,” i.e. when one regards the objects of the senses as self-subsistent beings able to exist apart from our sensibility or representations of them or, as he also says, by “hypostatizing” one’s representations, turning them into self-subsistent things (cf. B519, A369, A385, A389).  To be a transcendental realist, then, is not to hold that there are things in themselves or independently existing objects as such.  The position concerns only the thing or object of immediate experience or perception, and the belief that it has a being in itself and thus can exist apart from the subject and his intuition (Anschauung) or cognitive faculty.  That is, the claim is that the thing of sense can exist apart from me, not that there are things (beings, entities) apart from me.  It is this claim which leads one directly into the “re-presentational” theory of perception and epistemology, as Kant indicates at A369, 372, —i.e. if sense things have a being in themselves and apart from me, are independently existing objects, then as outside me and as not immediately accessible, it is clear my perceptions cannot be of them as such but only of a “re-presentation” or copy of them; this is the “empirical idealism” with which transcendental realism is paired, transcendental idealism is accompanied by an “empirical realism,” that is to say, and this is very important, only if I hold the things to have no being in themselves/apart from me, can I be certain I am in touch with reality, the thing itself, and not with just its copy.

            Another highly important form of the question, especially for Fichte, is that which couches it in terms of “object” and “representation”:  Does the object of representation have an existence distinct from its representation, — or, Is the former divorceable from the latter?

 

Dogmatism versus Criticism

 

            Since the relationship between the Thing and the Thing in itself is so very crucial, it may be helpful to indicate here briefly, how from what alone is given in experience, viz. the Thing, a “Thing in itself” (or its concept) first originates, and thus how the position of transcendental realism itself, also known as “dogmatism”—which is contrasted with “criticism” (Kant’s position)—first arises.  This will also shed light on Kant’s own position:

            1] We begin with the situation the self finds itself in, “the given” (if you will).   I perceive things/have perceptions. (these things are the only things that are present to me, which I know anything about).

            2] Then I reflect:  “The thing I perceive must have an independent existence, i.e., must be a Thing able to exist by itself, or is a Thing in itself (a Being, a self-subsistent).” That is, I posit them as having such an existence. In effect, I hypostatize the unity of myself and the object (percept) (cf. the Transcendental Aesthetic PP1, A19).  However, what is important, at this point I have not as yet entered into the error of Transcendental Realism, an error which forces me to conclude that my perception is the perception only of a copy, not of the original or reality itself. —The present position is that of “naive realism” and the standpoint of the empirical sciences, viz. the thing has independent reality (is a thing in itself) and I have total access to it - it appears, and is as it appears; reality and appearance coincide.

            3] I then reflect:  “If they have a being in themselves, then evidently I have no access to them, but to their copies only, i.e., I must not be in immediate relation with them.”

            At this point, what occurs is that a “disjunction,” “split,” or “gap” is instituted which separates the object from the perception or representation, which can be symbolized as follows:

 

 

______________

______________      ____________

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

            4] It is precisely at this point that the position Kant calls “transcendental realism” is born.  I first come to the idea of a Thing existing outside my experience (as cause of the same)! - that is, to the idea of a Thing existing “in itself,” a “Thing in itself,” for short.  Thus, the “Thing in itself” comes right out of the Thing of immediate experience.  It is the (sense) thing.....doubled!   One of the results of the investigation will be that not only is this how the “thing in itself” originates, but that this is the only “thing in itself” to be found in the Critique.  And since Kant’s position is that one who holds this view is thereby a transcendental realist, Kant’s true position is: —There is no Thing in itself!  This, I submit, expresses Kant’s position precisely.

            Further, it is possible to distinguish not less than seven objects operative in the Critique, viz.,

1] The Thing (of sense; “object,” “appearance”)

2] The Thing in itself, in the immanent sense

3], 4] The Thing in itself, in the transcendent sense, having two senses

5] The Transcendental Object, in the immanent sense

6] The Transcendental Object, in the transcendent sense

7] The Noumenon

 

            1] We have discussed (the object of experience, spatial, temporal, sensible, material-physical, extended).

            2] The Thing in itself in the immanent sense, is the Thing of experience, 1], but viewed as able to exist by itself, yet totally accessible, and not yet regarded as existing outside experience (“naive realism”).

            3] & 4] The Thing in itself in the transcendent sense, has two senses:

            3] This is the “immanent Thing in itself 2]” but now posited as existing outside experience, and regarded as the “cause” of our perception or of its copy.  (the Thing in itself of the Transcendental Realist, the psychologist, and perhaps Descartes).

            4] This is any thing or being taken as existing outside or independently of experience, not necessarily as a “cause” of our perceptions (or their objects) (e.g. the Divine being, other persons-minds, angels), and as nonspatial, -temporal, -material, -sensible, -extended, an “intelligible” object (ens - “originarium,” “realissimum,” etc.); the same as a “Noumenon.”

            5] The Transcendental Object in the immanent sense, is that related to Transcendental Apperception (I am) and the categories and goes into the constituting of an object of experience, 1], “that in which a manifold of intuition is united,” and which is that of the Understanding’s “Pure Concept of an Object,” i.e. the “Pure Concept of a Transcendental Object.” —As such, it only refers to the objects or things of experience, and not to anything “beyond” or “transcendent” of experience.

            6] The Transcendental Object in the transcendent sense [A614/B642], this has the same meaning as 3] & 4], and always has a reference to objects of experience or appearances as in some sense their “cause” or “ground”; this will be clarified below.

            7] The Noumenon, since it is purely “intelligible” and nonspatial, etc., it is the same as 3], 4] and 6].  This is a vestige of pre-Kantian, pre-critical philosophy (the “I know not what” of Locke and the empiricists) and of the “Inaugural Dissertation” (1770).  Kant has critical doubts about it (it “may be nothing at all” A253, A49). —In any case, it can only be “thought of,” and reduces to a “thought – viz., of an intelligible, nonspatial, -extended, etc., independently existing object, which I (and others) hold is self-contradictory and unthinkable, though of course Kant’s official position is that it is not (the positive & negative Noumenon will be treated below). It will turn out that 1] the Thing, is the only real object in the Critique.

 

            It can be seen from a sampling of their texts that the critics I have selected—Allison, Strawson, Walker, Waxman, Findlay, Sherover, Bohme and Srzednicki—do in fact give an affirmative answer to the above question and thus in so doing, I would submit, confess they are in truth transcendental realists, holding to what the majority refer to as a “weighty” object as present in the Critique and claiming Kant holds appearance or the object of representation or perception to exist distinct from the same:

 

[Kant’s argument] cannot establish any connection between the unity of apperception and objects in the “weighty” sense (148).[2] Allison

 

How, then, is the doctrine that bodies are but a species of our representationsto be reconciled with the doctrine that we are immediately conscious of the existence of objects in space distinct from our perceptions?[3]  (259) P.F. Strawson

 

Objects are entities in the external world—things like tables and tiepins, capable of existing independently of their perceivers. …  Judgements of experience [are] those which purport to agree with some independent object.[4] (76) R.C.S. Walker

 

Generally speaking, Kant has used the term “Gegenstand” … to refer to what is conceived by us to be external to us and/or to be independent in its being of [our] cognitive or intellectual processes.[5] (253) C.M. Sherover

 

Kant is right … the object of perception must be objective, i.e. independent of that very perception.[6] (265) J. Srzednicki

 

We will see that nowhere in his book does Kant speak of the object of experience or define it thus:  “by the object I mean that which has an existence independently or distinct from perception, representation, and our cognitive faculty.”  —This construal of the “object” is the old “transcendent” concept of an object—qua an “independently existing entity”—of the philosophical Tradition previous to Kant which his “Copernican Revolution” is to render obsolete and replace with a new “immanent” conception of an object construed in terms of (as grounded in) an Act of apperception whereby two or more perceptions/representations are linked (“synthesized”) by a category in a judgement.

 

            I would like to acknowledge here that I owe no small debt to Daniel Breazeale for the central vision which informs my interpretation. His fine translation of Fichte’s early texts in his Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, one passage in particular, gave me the clue to the correct way to read Kant’s Critique, viz. without entering it with the assumption of a transcendent, independent Thing in itself, viewed as behind the appearances and as cause of my perceptions, and instead starting the book with assuming no more than the I and what is given in experience, viz., the Thing - making a determined effort to keep from straying out of the present, the immediate, with wings, flying into transcendent realms. The Fichtean text I refer to is this:  ‘I require my readers to “check” the Thing in itself at the door before they even enter my Wissenschaftslehre; we begin simply with the “I” and what we find in it [viz. a manifold of intuitions],”—we do not find (look high or low) a “Thing in itself,”[7]‘ etc (SW II, 445, my paraphrase; and see below p. 309).

            When I applied what he said to the Critique thinking Kant must be at least as smart as Fichte, and “checked” my “Thing in itself” at the door and entered the Critique without it, I found—a different Kant.  I also found that Kemp Smith’s translation—which many of us rely on—was in many places intentionally biased so as to support a “transcendent” Thing in itself reading of Kant’s text.  A non-transcendent reading of the Critique not only is possible - upon close inspection of the German - but turns out to be also correct (as yielding - for the first time - a radically consistent Kant). —One glaring example is his translation of Kant’s

 

Dagegen ist der transzendentale Begriff der Erscheinungen imRaume eine kritische Erinnerung, dass uberhaupt nichts, was im Raume angeschaut wird, eine Sache an sich, noch dass der Raume eine Form der Dinge sei, die ihnen etwa an sich selbst eigen ware, sondern dass uns die Gegenstande an sich gar nicht bekannt sind, und usw.,  (A30)

As:

The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are quite unknown to us, etc.

 

Note Kemp Smith’s wording clearly suggests Kant is committed to the actuality of transcendent, independently existing things/entities (“things in themselves”), and note carefully that he illicitly conflates “der Dinge. . .” and “. . . an sich selbst” so as to read “Things in themselves,” also that the word “unknown” is not in the German, rather “known” (bekannt).  A truer more faithful rendering—with my annotations—would be,

 

The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder that in general nothing intuited in space is a Being (Sache) in itself, that space is not a form of [sensible] things which would be something belonging to them in themselves [which would belong to them in themselves], but rather that objects in themselves are in no way known to us [or: we are not at all acquainted (bekannt not erkannt) with objects in themselves, —meaning not that there actually are such objects and we are, to boot, deprived of knowledge of them (the common reading), but rather simply that the objects we are acquainted with in experience [!] (which we intuit) are not objects in themselves, are not objects capable of existing in themselves, —for they are merely appearances (“which cannot exist in themselves” (A42)), —and these are the only objects we are acquainted with (as to a “thing in itself”, no such thing is to be found within experience, period).]

 

Thus, it clearly seems possible to read the text without any ontological committment to “supersensible”, transexperienceable entities.[8]  I discovered moreover to my amazement, that no text exists in the Critique which expressly links a “Thing in itself”, “affection,” and perception/sensibility; —the crucial, often decisive A20 does not say that the “Thing in itself affects our receptivity,” but rather that an “object” (Gegenstand) does. That this object is not the Thing in itself but rather an appearance is confirmed at A20 where the “object of an empirical intuition” is—“to be entitled appearance”!  Thus Fichte’s text—thanks to Breazeale—encouraged me to hold fast to my “new” reading in the face of the great opposition of scholarship that was against it, most of which—if not all—gives a “dogmatic” reading that assumes at the start and as a matter of course (established fact) the texts must refer to a transcendent, “causal” Thing in itself and make a commitment as to its reality.

            There are then 2 distinct “Models” (or “standpoints”) one can use in the reading of the Critique which can be named—after the literature appearing after 1781 in response to it—the “dogmatic” and the “critical.”

The Dogmatic - which reads the Critique with the assumption of an independent thing in itself, taking Kant to hold to its real existence (the standpoint of “common sense,” and virtually all previous philosophy, Ancient through Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke).  According to it there are two things that exist:  on the one side, a subject or knower, on the other, an independent thing (being, “thing in itself”), that which is to be known.  This “traditional” Model immediately lands one in the insoluble problem (viz. “skepticism”) of how one is to “get at” the object/the known, of how the independent thing/entity can get into (“migrate” into) the knower and of how I can know the object not as it appears to me (as re-presented) but as it “really is” in itself—and as well, to the “standard” view in Kant interpretations, that independent “Things” are already “out there” before experience, and when we “open our eyes,” or activate our cognitive faculties or “mechanism,” we thus “put them in” or add/impose space and time on them.

The Critical - which reads the Critique without this “dogmatic” assumption.  According to this one begins simply with what is immediately given/found in sense intuition - and with nothing else (a merely interior reading of the text, instead of an interior/exterior reading).  Hence the only “object” there is, is the sensible object of experience, the Thing —(and as we shall see, the only Thing there is in the Critique, - the “thing in itself” being a deception, the ground of a transcendental “illusion,” namely, of transcendental realism and “dogmatism”).  This latter claim, that there is no “thing in itself” in the Critique, is to be regarded as a subsidiary thesis for which I shall attempt to argue.  As part of my strategy regarding my methodology I will be using the Critical Model in reading Kant’s text.

            As I hold most scholars are entangled in dogmatism or common sense realism of one form or another and as I hold Kant’s position to be the exact opposite of this, indeed is best understood as being its contradictory opposite, a more detailed and historical-genetic account of the difference between Dogmatism and Criticism will shed no small light on our problematic.  What is especially remarkable is that many scholars seem to be completely unaware of this difference and of the fact that the conversion of “things in themselves” (or “weighty objects”) into “appearances” is precisely the central motif of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism.

            Thus “dogmatism,” is the belief in mind or subject independent realities; in particular, the view that some or all of the features of the experiential object (primary & secondary qualities) are able to exist apart from the subject or its power of representation.  Transcendental Idealism or “Criticism”, on the other hand, holds that none of the object’s features, the object being “appearance only” not “thing in itself,” “can exist outside our mind”(B520) - or, more strikingly, that the Universe—the entire spatiotemporal continuum—has no existence whatsoever outside, distinct from our minds and therefore exists only within the bounds of our sensibility (as Strawson correctly holds).

            Thus it can be said that the shift from dogmatism to criticism (or “transcendental idealism”) is the distinctive feature of Kant’s philosophy, indeed, that all philosophies previous to Kant’s were infected with some kind or other of dogmatism.  It is even fair to say that Modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes, can be seen as Reason’s gradual emancipation of itself from the deception of dogmatism, its belief in entities apart from the subject and its cognitive powers/mind. 

The over-coming or -turning of this common sense view of the object’s independent existence began with Descartes’ Meditations, 1641, when the indispensable role and presence of the I (knower or consciousness) in knowledge came into view.  Its result was that no longer were there “things” but instead merely my perceptions or “ideas” of things—a world of self-subsistent “things” outside me became a world of ideas inside me, so many contents-modifications of my mind or Cogito—the focus of philosophy then shifted from ontology to epistemology, from Being as such, to Being-in-relation-to-consciousness.  I, the subject, no longer had a direct access to beings, but only an indirect one, i.e., via inference from my ideas or re-presentations, from what was “within me” to what was “without me.”  One class of my ideas was “objective” in that it represented properties actually belonging to things outside my mind, viz. ideas of extension, figure, motion—“primary qualities.”  Other of my ideas were only “subjective,” presenting properties which reflected my sensory make-up rather than the thing itself—color, sound, tactile qualities—”secondary qualities.”  Thus, at this point the Object has experienced a considerable loss of properties, the bulk of its sensible properties now regarded as not intrinsic to the object but rather only as relating to the subject, the object in itself being the strictly non-sensible, “mathematical” one of extension (spatiality-materiality), figure and motion, the “quantified” object of the “new” physics/natural science (in contrast to the “old” Aristotelian-scholastic “qualified” view of nature).  The former fell on the side of the subject, the latter on that of the object.—This view of the object was held by Locke and the empiricists as well.

            Notice here that (scientific) knowledge of these real, extended, shaped, and moving objects was mediated or inferred only and not direct.  All we had to do with were the immediate contents of the mind-Cogito, its “subjective” sensations and ideas.  We possessed and knew directly merely the “ideas” of space, figure and motion, not space, figure and motion themselves.  All we could do was to “infer” or believe that the “things” existing outside and independently of our minds did in fact “correspond” or agree with their ideas or re-presentations existing only in us.—With Leibniz we take a further step away from dogmatism and closer to criticism by moving from the absolute space of Newton and Descartes to strictly “relative” space, i.e. space is not in itself but only in relation to things or “Monads” in space (about which more later).  When we reach Kant (via Wolff, Locke, Hume et al) the final overcoming of dogmatism takes place, viz. with Kant’s ingenious equation, Space (extension) = Pure Intuition (as well as with his new focus on the “I” and on a “Thing-in-itself”[9]).  This equation yields two important things. First, the object suffers the loss of its remaining qualities—extension, figure, motion—which get accordingly transferred to the subject, to its faculty of sensibility.

            Second, since nothing remains to constitute an object independent of the subject (cf. A42, B44, A253, B345), the dividing line of what falls within the subject and what lies without—collapses, along with the notion of representations being re-presentations of objects or things (“once upon a time” sensible, spatial, material) existing outside or independently of the subject.—This leads directly to the true “critical” view of the actual situation (between knower and known, subject and object), viz. that the representation (Vor-stellung) and the object are one and the same thing (Kant e.g. A371, Fichte II, 441; and see Prolegomena (289) 33 Ellington).

            “Dogmatism” on the other hand involves a deep-rooted deception or delusion (A388), to be expelled only by criticism.  My ordinary common sense view of the world, which I have been steeped in since my earliest years, regards the “World,” being, or “things” as something that has always existed, is “there,” outside of me (in the transcendental sense; cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations), existing on its own account (“in itself”), as a fully self-constituted, indifferent being, i.e., in advance of my experience of it.  The “World” is what is primary or fundamental (independently “given”); - “I,” on the other hand, exist as what is secondary or derivative (and inessential, incidental to its being and make-up), a subject, which can as well be as not be.  The World is there complete by itself - the I, the knower is, so to speak, placed or introduced into it “from outside”—the assumption being that both the knower and the World each have an independent being and are quite able to exist and “get along perfectly well” without each other, and apart from their union which is called Knowing (Erkennen) or Experience (Erfahrung).  Criticism finds this assumption (“deception”) misguided, and on two counts:  1. it assumes the I is something derivative, dispensable, that it is possible to abstract from or ignore the I (subject, knower, consciousness), and thus to consider the World or Being as it is apart from the I —which is impossible (for “The ‘I think’ must be able to … etc.” B131). It is impossible to effect this separating of the object of consciousness-representation from consciousness, i.e. to pretend the I is not there, is not an ineliminable factor of Experience.  2. If it is assumed that the Knower and Being (the object, world, known) are from the start independent of one another, exist “outside” of one another, then the fact of knowledge is made inexplicable, incomprehensible. That is, how can what is first outside me, come later to be inside me, to be for me, to be an object of knowledge or experience?  This is possible only if Being (the object, world) was within me or in immediate relation with me (with knowing) from the beginning, if knowing and being are parts/factors of a single unity, neither able to exist apart from or “overstep” the other.  Dogmatism believes it can start immediately with the object and side-step the I - whereas Criticism knows as against this deception that one cannot transgress this boundary, or “go beyond the I” - one must—can only—begin with the I (or with the unity of I and Thing) and never “egress” from or “fracture” it.

            Thus it can be said, the hallmark of dogmatism (and the “letter”) is dis-unity, that of knowing and being, representing and object, subject and object, while that of criticism (the “spirit”) is unity, of the same. The former is unable to account for the possibility of Experience (the fact that there is an object for me at all) - whereas the latter alone can.  In this lies the true meaning of Kant’s oft-used expression “in us,” as in “appearances are in us,” “space, time, objects of experience are in us,” —viz. if an object were not in us, or were outside us or independent of us, then it could not be/become an object for us, an object of experience and cognition.  Thus to start with Being as such, which dogmatism wants to do, is illicit, as it involves an ungrounded and ungroundable assumption, based on the deception which (mis)takes appearances for things in themselves (B535).

            Because dogmatism, in all its varieties, is so deeply ingrained in us and those around us, it takes much time and effort to overcome—and this only through criticism.  Most scholars (Kantian and others) have not yet vanquished theirs (as will appear); this is why they settle in most cases for a “compromise” position, a mixture of criticism and dogmatism, idealism and realism.  They realize doubtless that Kant clearly says in many places that space and appearances in space are “transcendently ideal”, i.e. have no reality, are nothing apart from us, from our sensibility, but their dogmatism will not let them fully accept it, hence they go on to speak of objects “in the weighty sense” as spatial, material objects that are able to exist “independently” of the subject, perceiver, and his cognitive faculties.

 

 

[1] Schelling, Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, trans. by F. Marti in On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge, 156.

[2] H.E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) 148, 136.

[3] P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Routledge, 1966) 259.

[4] R.C.S. Walker, Kant (London: Routledge, 1978) 76.

[5]  C.M. Sherover, Essays (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982) 253.

[6]  Srzednicki, Kant-Studien 75 (1984) 94-103.  

[7] J.G.Fichte, Sammtliche Werke (SW), Ed. I.H. Fichte, 8 vols. (Berlin: Veit, 1845-46) II:445, trans. by Breazeale in Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 325.

[8] Kant’s text can be read as also saying merely that “in knowing the objects of experience, we are not in any way knowing a “Thing in itself”—i.e. a thing which is either “in itself” or can exist in itself, or both a thing which is able to exist in itself (the transcendental realist position) and a thing as it is in itself (the naive realist position - and such a thing being impossible), or experience does not yield knowledge of a Thing in itself, but only of an appearance.”

[9] [?] Cf.  This conflict of reason with itself must be resolved, even if it should not prove possible within the Theoretical Science of Knowledge; and since the absolute existence of the self cannot be given up, the issue must be decided in favor of the second line of argument, just as in dogmatic idealism (but with this difference, that our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not determine what is, but what ought to be). But this must be done in such a way as to explain what needs explaining; which dogmatism could not do. The diminished activity of the self must find an explanation in the self as such; the ultimate ground of it must be posited in the self. This comes about in that the self, which in this respect is practical, is posited as a self that ought to contain in itself the ground of existence of the not-self [universe or object], which diminishes the activity of the intellective self; an infinite Idea which cannot itself be thought, and by which, therefore, we do not so much explain the explicandum as show, rather, that, and why, it is inexplicable; the knot is not so much loosed as projected into infinity.

Kant’s Critique as a “Puzzle”

 

            At this point the reader may object, “What about those four or five passages where Kant clearly speaks of a “transcendental object” underlying appearances and representations as their “cause” or “ground” - surely that these texts exist cannot be denied, what of them?” Since this is a weighty objection I feel it necessary to give here some general response to it. First, one must remember that the Critique appeared within a specific historical period and cultural milieu. Kant, it must be granted, was far ahead of his somewhat “enlightened” but still basically medieval (“theocentric” – in the pejorative sense) age. Recall he says, in his essay on “Enlightenment,” not that we live in an enlightened age but rather in an age of enlightenment, meaning much superstition and dogmatism still clung to humanity and its thinking. I would venture that Kant was acutely aware of his concrete situation. He knew that on his new critical principles one could not ignore the “I think” and thus talk meaningfully about entities (e.g. “God”) that are out of relation with the subject and outside her experience. He knew his standpoint could be viewed as implying atheism—recall, all of his disciples, e.g. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sooner or later were branded as “atheists,” since they all came ultimately to deny any type of independently existing- or mind-independent- being whatever. Indeed, as they all said, freedom demands that there be no “thing in itself,” contemporary with itself and having absolute causality, because it would do away with freedom. Hence, I feel—since freedom, it can be argued, is the real objective and desideratum of his philosophy—that Kant was forced in effect to accommodate himself to everyone, to dogmatists and criticists alike. If so, then he deliberately inserted a few “clinkers,” i.e. dogmatic passages into his text to “throw off” the authorities (much like Descartes did several decades earlier), to leave an open a place for a “thing in itself” and for the “transcendent” Divine Being of orthodoxy and thus avoid the charge of “atheism” by the censors. It is to be kept in mind, 1. that Kant knew the categories only apply within experience, hence that these “dogmatic” passages were in fact meaningless as involving an illicit use of the categories of cause and ground, and 2. that he knew his Berkeley, hence that the idea of a “being independent of thought and perception” was self-contradictory and unthinkable. Indeed, everything points to Kant’s intentionally making the Critique into a kind of “puzzle,” - one which only the brighter minds of the age would be able to solve, again much like Descartes was forced to do in regard to his Meditations in order to get it approved by the Catholic authorities. Thus I submit Kant was fully aware of the incompatibleness of his own standpoint, “criticism,” and that of the common view, “dogmatism,” however to keep his book(s) in circulation and thereby enlighten the German nation (to fulfill his literary mission) he, so to speak, had to give the appearance of being “one of the crowd,” i.e. a dogmatist too, exactly what he was overthrowing, and leave room for a “thing in itself.” As we will see, one of the “key’s” to his “puzzle” is that the so-called “Ground” of the phenomena-noumena distinction is in fact an “insufficient ground,” i.e. there really is no ground (to stand on) for a “thing in itself.”

            Of course, another possibility is that Kant himself never fully overcame his own dogmatism. For he, like everyone else, also began his life and career as a dogmatist, i.e. as a believer in intelligible entities existing “in themselves” outside the mind. Indeed, as the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 makes quite clear Kant originally believed in an “intelligible world” as well as a “sensible world,” our pure intuition able to make immediate contact with its objects, sensible appearances, our pure concepts also presumably able to do the same vis-a-vis its non-sensible objects, “things in themselves”.[1] It was only later as he confesses in his letter to Marcus Herz that he began to question the relation of our concepts to “intelligible things in themselves,” i.e. how can a concept relate a priori to an object which is totally independent of it and from which it was not derived? It was at this point that he first began to restrict the use of concepts to experience alone and deny their validity for metaphysics, i.e., for transcendent objects.

            A third possibility is that, as he says in the B-Edition Preface, he had to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith,” i.e. for free practical activity and the moral life, which seem to demand a place for a “transcendent God” and other supersensible existents (e.g. other selves). But perhaps we would do well to listen to those who openly declare that the time has come for a new immanent God or Absolute to replace the old transcendent, inaccessible God of the tradition. –That is, for example, to Schelling who says:

 

            You may give me a thousand revelations of an absolute causality outside myself, and a thousand demands for it on behalf of an intensified practical reason, yet I shall never be able to believe in it as long as my theoretical reason remains the same. My capacity even to assume an absolute object would presuppose that I had first abolished myself as a believing subject!  [Further, note:] My objections are not aimed at criticism, but at certain expounders of it, who might have learned that criticism advances the idea of God merely as an object of action, and not at all as an object to be considered as true. I don’t say that they should have learned it from the very spirit of critical philosophy. But they might have learned it at the very least from the word Kant used: postulate. The meaning of this term they should know from mathematics, if not otherwise.[2]

 

—And to Fichte who remarks:

 

            My absolute I is not the individual, though this is how offended courtiers and irate philosophers have interpreted me. … Instead, the individual must be deduced from the absolute I. As individuals, we find ourselves at that standpoint which I call the practical standpoint. (I call the standpoint of the absolute I the speculative standpoint.) According to this practical point of view, a world exists for us which is independent of us and which we can do no more than modify. From this standpoint, the pure I is posited outside ourselves and is called God.[3]

 

—And to those in general who say, with three Tubingen seminary students of yore:  “We belong to the new race of men who no longer seek for immortality and God without but rather within themselves.”[4]  That is to say, to those who hold freedom and a thing-in-itself to be, in the last analysis, incompatible.

 ETC, ETC.

 

[1]See Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation or On the Form and Principle of the Sensible and the Intelligible World, Section II, “On the Distinction Between Sensible Things and Intelligible Things in general,” Werke II, 392, 397, Ed. and trans, by L.W. Beck in Kant Selections (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1988) 54, 58. Also cf. Kant’s important letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772.

[2] See Schelling’s remarks in his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism 1795 (Marti 156ff) which have applicability to many of today’s Kantians.  And also cf. 76n:  “For whatever can say I to itself, also says I am! The pity is that, in theoretical philosophy, God is not determined as identical with my I [!} but etc.”  And 99:  “In the theoretical sense God isI = Not-I; in the practical sense He is absolute I, which annihilates all not-I.  Insofar as the nonfinite I is represented schematically as the ultimate [moral] goal of the finite and thus outside the latter, in practical philosophy God can indeed be represented as outside the finite I (schematically) however only as identical with the nonfinite.”

[3] Fichte’s letter to Jacobi, August 30, 1795 (Breazeale, 411).

[4] Schelling, Holderlin, and Hegel’s, Earliest System-Programme (Berne, 1796), trans. by H. Harris in Hegel’s Development, Towards the Sunlight, 1770-1801, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) 510-512.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, “Absolute Knowledge.” Course Syllabus, Spr. 2016

St. John’s University

Spring 2016

Metaphysics
               Philosophy  3000c                                                                                                                                           Office Hours: W after class, and by Appt. SJH-B3.

Wednesday, St. John Hall 113, 10:45 – 1:30 pm & 7:00 – 9:50 pm                           
Email: FoldesK@stjohns.edu

 

Course Description:

(Prerequisite: Phi 1000c). This course is an introduction to G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical masterpiece, The Phenomenology of Spirit, which ends in “Absolute Knowledge.” Hegel is today widely acknowledged to be the most important philosopher in history and many scholars even say that with his 1807 achievement “human history has come to an end,” making possible for the first time the dawning of a totally New World and New “Divine-Humanity.” The course will begin by tracing the roots of Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge project in the works of his predecessors, Plato, Descartes, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Our introductory study of the Phenomenology will embrace issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, and the Philosophies of Religion, Politics, History, Science, and Art—questions such as: What is Reality? Why is there something rather than nothing? Is there evidence of “God’s” existence? Is there a solution to the problem of Evil? Does our knowledge permit of ultimate foundations or certainty? Does the Universe have a purpose or goal? An effort will be made to show the relevance and application of Absolute Knowledge to our present world situation and life challenges.

 Course Objectives:

The aim of this course is to provide a general introduction to metaphysics and some of its main problems by means of a study of one of its primary texts. It is also designed to enhance students’ overall understanding of reality, history, and today’s world and to help them succeed in the challenges of a complex global culture, as well as contribute to the general task of creating a better world. Students have the opportunity to assimilate the course content through various means, i.e., lectures, discussions, readings, and homework. Class participation further aids in mastery of the course content and especially serves to clarify the readings from primary and secondary sources. Midterm and Final examinations provide feedback as to the extent of the student’s knowledge while term papers and quizzes serve as tools through which students can analyze and present philosophical ideas.

 

Required Texts:

G.W.F. Hegel. The Phenomenology of Spirit, Tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford. (“Hegel”)  (Always Bring to class)

Robert Stern. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Routledge. (“Stern”)  

Ken Foldes. Supplement to PHI 3000C Metaphysics (course-pak) (“Supp”) with excerpts from Plato’s Republic, Descartes’ Meditations, etc. (Bring to class)

Suggested*:

Foldes. Hegel and The Solution to Our Postmodern World Crisis.

Foldes. The Jedi Handbook of Global Education (“TJH”).
Jon Stewart. The Unity of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  
H.S. Harris. Hegel’s Ladder, I, II.
Jean Hyppolite. Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  
Quentin Lauer. A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.
{
*All of these books are available “on reserve” in the SJU Library}  


 

 

Recommended:

Aristotle. Metaphysics (esp. Book Lambda).

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica.

Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason.

J.G. Fichte. The Way Towards the Blessed Life: The Doctrine of Religion.

G.W.F. Hegel. The Science of Logic, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind /Spirit and Religion.

 

Bases for the Final Grade:

Final grades will be based on the following: A Midterm Exam* worth 40% of the course grade (No Make-up!),
a Final Exam* worth 40%, and Class Participation worth 20%. There will also be Quizzes on the Homework. There will also be an Extra Credit (of up to ½ or 1 letter grade) for a Term Paper (3 pgs. or 6 pgs. typed) on any topic in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (your topic must be approved by Prof. Topic due date is Apr. 13). (No emailed papers!!!). 

 

Course Outline, Schedule & Readings:

 

January 20  Introduction. Overview of the Course. What is happening in the world today? The End of HISTORY, A Brief History of Philosophy, and the Global Paradigm Shift: We are entering a New Age, a New World (aka “The Jedi Order”). G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), Life and Works, The Phenomenology of Spirit and “Absolute Knowledge.” UNITY and true GLOBAL EDUCATION. On Meditation. PP Presentation: The Transcendence of History. Course Requirements, Questionnaire, & BIO. Course Goal: We need Absolute Scientists.

27   [Read Hegel 46-57; 505-7 (Analysis), xii-xxx (Summary). Stern 45-51; 53 (Summary), 30-37
(1-53). Supp 9-17 (Plato’s Republic, esp. 13-17: The Cave, The Divided Line, The Two Worlds, and The Good), 18-24 (Descartes’ Meditations, esp. 20-23), 25-27 (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel). Plato’s central teaching: “There is not one but two worlds or realities.”  On Polarity. Thales & Parmenides. Philosophy’s Question: What is REALITY? The “Arche” & UNITY. Recommended: TJH Appendix One: The History of Modern Philosophy 469-80, 35-66].   Bring “Supp” to class!
INTRODUCTION (to the Phenomenology).

·        What is the “Instrument” view (or Kantian view) of knowledge? (46-48)

·        What is Hegel’s METHOD (and plan) in the Phenomenology for reaching KNOWLEDGE, i.e., “Absolute Knowledge” or Science? (52-56)

·        In brief, what is “Absolute Knowledge (or Knowing)”?  (Hint: the Subject/Object, Knowing/Being Unity; I = I; Consciousness is Reality, or, “There is only One Consciousness.”)

February 3  [Read Hegel 58-68; 507-10. Stern 54-62; 82-83. Study Groups formed.]
“A. CONSCIOUSNESS [of Other].” Sense-Certainty: The This and Meaning.

·        What is the difference between section “A. Consciousness” and section “B. Self-Consciousness”?

·        Briefly characterize “Sense-Certainty”– the first contender/claim to true Knowledge – its subjective side and its Object.

·        How does our EXPERIENCE of the Object as a “This” (unique individual) show the Object to be in reality a “Not This” – or a “Universal”?

17[Read Hegel 67-79; 510-13. Stern 62-71; 83-84]
“A. CONSCIOUSNESS [of Other].” Perception: The Thing and Deception.

·        Why is “Perception of a Thing (with properties)” not true Knowledge? – Or Why doesn’t the Thing (Object) correspond to its Concept (to be self-identical or non-contradictory)?

·        What is the “deception” pertaining to the Thing? – Or Why does “perception” also involve our “reflection” (or our being responsible for features of the Thing)?

·        What is the Result of the Perception chapter (of “the dialectic”) and the new true Object?

March    2  [Read Hegel 79-103; 513-18. Stern 71-82; 84]
“A. CONSCIOUSNESS [of Other].” Force and the Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World.

·        What does Hegel mean by saying: “the reflection is the same on both sides, or, there is only one reflection (p. 79)”?

·        We now know that the Object – what truly exists – is Consciousness itself (the “I” or Concept) and not sense-Things. But the Understanding thinks that the Object or what it knows are Forces or Laws located behind the sense-Things (regarded as a world of “appearance”) as their cause or ground.
How does Understanding come to know what we already know about the Object of Consciousness (include “explanation,” the “inverted world” and “infinity”)? 

 

 

 

 

    • Hegel sums up the Result of the Understanding chapter in this way: “[when the curtain of appearance is drawn away] we have the inner being (the “I”) gazing into the inner world (the “I”) (p. 103).” What does this mean?

      March     9  [Read Hegel 104-38; 518-27. Stern 85-112; 112-13] Hand-in homework answers!  Review for Midterm.
      “B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS [of Itself].” The Truth of Self-Certainty. Introduction (Truth, Life/Desire, Recognition). A: Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Master/Slave.  B: Freedom of self-consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness. (The OBJECT here is the “I” and: Life, Another “I”, the World, and God).
             We have now reached a critical turning-point in the Phenomenology. For “Self-Consciousness” is in essence the end of the book! All that remains is to increase the CONTENTS of the “I” (or Self or Concept) by filling it with the remaining contents/objects of Consciousness.

    • Discuss the transitions from Desire-Life, to Recognition, to the Life and Death struggle, which ends with the two Independent (Master) and Dependent (Slave) self-consciousnesses.

    • In “B: Freedom of self-consciousness” it is the Slave that makes all further progress, and not the Master. Why?

    • Briefly characterize the world-views of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness, and their transition into one another. What are their respective attitudes towards “the world”?

                  16  MIDTERM Exam. AND: Continuation of “B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS [of Itself],” especially “the Unhappy Consciousness.”    

23  [Read Hegel 139-210; 527-40. Stern 114-32; 153-4]
“C. (AA). REASON. The Certainty and Truth of Reason (as All Reality). Introduction (Consciousness is All Reality, Idealism, and the Category = the Unity of the “I” and Being).
A: Observing Reason. Observation of (a) Nature: inorganic-organic, (b) Self-Consciousness: logical-psychological laws, and (c) Self-Consciousness: physiognomy-phrenology.   

    • What is the connection between the Minister (priest, middle term) and Reason’s certainty of being All Reality and All Truth? (136-39)

    • How do true Idealism and false Idealism (Kant and Fichte) differ? (140-45)

    • Since Reason (the unity of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness) now knows it is all reality, its aim here is to find just itself (Reason) in nature and the world. How does Reason’s attitude toward “the world” differ from that of the preceding shapes (Greek-Roman, Medieval)?

    • Why does Reason find it hard to discover classifications and laws in Nature?

    • The Result of (c), and this whole section, is that “self-consciousness (the “I”, Ego) is a Thing (a “skull”).” What does this mean?

30[Read Hegel 211-62; 540-50. Stern 133-53; 154-5]
“C. (AA). REASON (cont’d).”  B: Active Reason (Actualization of rational Self-Consciousness through its own Activity). (Introduction: Reason/The Concept is realized in a Nation: The “I” and Thinghood, Reason as an Individual seeks its Happiness): (a) Pleasure and Necessity, (b) The Law of the Heart, and (c) Virtue and the Way of the World.  C: Practical Reason (Individuality which takes itself to be absolutely real): (a) The Spiritual Animal Kingdom, (b) Reason as Lawgiver, and (c) Reason as Testing Laws.  

    • Reason (or Self-Consciousness) will now try to find itself and its happiness in the world and in others through individual Action (rather than Observation/Theory). Discuss why the three outlooks in “B” fail (hint: the Individual vs the Universal).

    • Here in “C”, Individuality, as absolute reality, expresses itself through Action – and then uses Reason to make and test Laws (Universals) to govern its actions and behavior. What is the Result of this section?

April        6   [Read Hegel 263-363; 550-68. Stern 156-90; 205-6]
“C. (BB). SPIRIT (MIND).”  Introduction: Transition from Reason (as the certainty of being all reality) to Spirit (as conscious of the World as itself: “I and the World are One”). Spirit (ethical life, actual historical communities/nations) is the true ground of all preceding shapes. Here Spirit will actualize itself in three phases:  A: True immediate-harmonious Spirit (Greek and Roman),  B: Self-Alienated Spirit (Medieval, Modern, to French Revolution), and C: Spirit Certain of Itself (Kantian-Fichtean Morality).
A: The True Spirit. The Ethical [JEDI] Order: (a) The ethical world (human/divine law, man/woman), (b) Ethical action (Antigone), and (c) Legal status (Rome, the “Person”).
B: Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture: I: Self-Alienated Spirit’s World: (a) Culture and its actuality, (b) Faith and pure Insight, II: The Enlightenment: (a) Its Struggle with superstition,
(b) Its Truth. III: Absolute Freedom and Terror.    

    • How did the harmony of Greek ethical life – of the immediate Spirit – collapse?

    • After the collapse of Spirit’s immediate form (Greek ethical life and the Roman legal “person”) individual consciousness becomes alienated from its world (medieval-modern). Discuss the progressive stages of this self-alienation leading up to the French Revolution and the Terror, namely: the instability of Culture’s values of Wealth (commerce) and State Power (politics), their rejection by the “disrupted consciousness,” the clash between Religion (faith) and Enlightenment (pure insight), and the limited freedom of the French Revolution.

13[Read Hegel 364-409; 568-77. 410-53; 577-84. Stern 191-205; 207. 208-15; 220] All Extra Credit Term Paper Topics due! 
“C. (BB). SPIRIT (MIND) (cont’d).”  C: Spirit Certain of Itself. Morality: (a) The Moral View of the World, (b) Dissemblance or duplicity, and (c) Conscience, the Beautiful Soul, Evil and its Forgiveness.
“C. (CC). RE-LIGION.”  A. Natural Religion: God as Light, Plant & Animal, Artificer.
B. Religion in the form of Art (Greek): The Abstract, Living, and Spiritual Work of Art.
C. The Revealed Religion. Absolute Spirit or God has appeared as the final Result of (BB) SPIRIT.
As a consequence, Spirit and all preceding forms now retreat into their true ground, Religion – which according to Hegel is in truth Spirit’s or God’s consciousness of him/herself.       

    • Discuss Kant’s concept of Morality, its shortcomings, and its resolution by Acting and Judging Conscience with the forgiveness of evil, mutual recognition (I = I), and the appearance of absolute Spirit or God.

    • Here in (CC) Religion we have followed the development of the religious consciousness and its Object (God or the in and for itself Absolute Being). Give a brief summary of the various types of Natural Religion and Religion in the form of Art, and their limitations.  

      20   [Read Hegel 453-78; 584-89. 479-93; 589-91. Stern 215-20; 220-21. 222-25; 225. Recommended: TJH “The Medieval Period,” 44-49]
      “C. (CC). RE-LIGION (cont’d).” Here in “revealed religion,” according to Hegel, we have the consummation or completion of Religion (God’s knowledge of him/herself; and “re-ligion” = the unity of opposites: human and divine) where God is realized as a “human being” and in a shape in which we can see ourselves.  C. The Revealed Religion: Religion’s Content (a) as Pure Thought (before Creation) (464-67), (b) as Picture-Thinking (Creation, Fall, Incarnation) (467-71), (c) as Universal Self-Consciousness (in the Community or Church) (471-77). Result & Transition (477-78).
      “C. (DD). ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.” [Introduction (479-80), Summary (480-82), Reconciliation of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness via Religion & Morality (482-83), Absolute Knowledge & Science (485-88), History: Medieval to Modern Philosophy: Descartes-Spinoza-Leibniz-Kant-Fichte-Schelling (488-90), Absolute Science: Logic-Nature-History/Spirit (490-93).]

    • What does Hegel mean when he says that: “God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge alone, and is only that knowledge itself” (p. 461)?

    • What does Hegel mean when he says that: “[The religious community’s knowledge is defective as the Church] is still burdened with an unreconciled split into a Here and a Beyond” (p. 463)?

    • What does Hegel mean by “the death of God”? – his saying that the true meaning of the Cross is that: “God Himself is dead” – and, further, when he speaks of: “the return of consciousness into the depths of the Night of ‘I = I’, which no longer knows anything outside of it” (p. 476)?

    • What is the main problem of the religious community or church, and why is it necessary to transcend religion into “Absolute Knowledge” (p. 477-78)?

    • What is “Absolute Knowledge” (p. 485-86)?

    • What does Hegel mean when he says that: “what in religion was content … is here the Self’s own Activity” – and that: “[the Concept is] the knowledge of the Self’s Act within itself as all essentiality and all existence” – and also that: “[Absolute Knowledge] is the ‘I’ that is this and no other ‘I’ … and no less a mediated universal ‘I’” (p. 485-86)?

    • What is the difference between the Phenomenology of Spirit and Science (Logic = “God before creation”) (p. 491)?

27  [Read same: Hegel 479-93; 589-91, etc.] Hand-in homework answers! Review for Final Exam.
“C. (DD). ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE (cont’d).  

“Only from this Chalice of spirits … foams forth to God his own infinitude.” Schiller.       

May        11   FINAL Exam. All Extra Credit Term Papers due.   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(N.B. Circumstances may require that this syllabus/outline be adjusted during the semester.)

Hegel On Immortality

Hegel On Immortality

 Many of your Hegel scholars believe and teach that for Hegel death is final and there is no personal or individual survival of biological death (e.g., Pinkard, Gio- vanni, Houlgate, and Harris). This is absolutely untrue as is shown by just a sampling of Hegel’s statements:

“Man is immortal in consequence of knowledge, for it is only as a thinking being that he is not a mortal animal soul, and is a free, pure soul. Reasoned knowledge, thought, is the root of man’s life, of his immortality as a totality in himself. The animal soul is sunk in the life of the body, while Spirit, on the other hand, is a totality in itself.” (Philosophy of Religion [PR], Speirs, Vol. III, p. 58)

“Man as Spirit is immortal, is an object of God’s interest, is raised above finitude and dependence, above external circumstances—he has his freedom to abstract himself from everything, and this implies that he can escape mortality. It is in religion that the immortality of the soul is the element of supreme importance, because the antithesis involved in religion is of an infinite kind. … What is mortal is what can die; what is im- mortal is what can reach a state in which death cannot enter. … Thus the immortality of the soul must not be represented as first entering the sphere of reality only at a later stage; the soul’s immortality is the actual present quality of Spirit; Spirit is eternal, and for this reason is already present. Spirit, as possessed of freedom, does not belong to the sphere of things limited; it, as being what thinks and knows in an absolute way, has the Universal for its object; this is eternity, which is not simply duration, as duration can be predicated of mountains, but knowledge. This eternity of Spirit is no longer entangled in what is natural, contingent, and external.” (PR, Vol. III, pp. 56-8)

“[The Spiritual Community] occupies itself with the certainty felt by the subject of its own infinite non-sensuous substantiality, and of the fact that it knows itself to be infinite and eternal, it knows itself to be immortal. … The soul, the individual soul, has an infi- nite, an eternal quality, namely, that of being a citizen in the Kingdom of God. This is a quality and a life which is removed beyond time and the Past.” (PR, Vol. III, pp. 104-6)

Spirit is immortal; it is eternal; and it is immortal and eternal in virtue of the fact that it is infinite, that it has no such spatial finitude as we associate with the body; when we speak of it being five feet in height, two feet in breadth and thickness, that it is not the Now of time, that the content of its knowledge does not consist of these countless midges, that its volition and freedom have not to do with the infinite mass of existing obstacles, nor of the aims and activities which such resisting obstacles and hindrances have to en- counter. The infinitude of Spirit is its inwardness.” … “The sorrow of the natural life is essentially connected with the greatness of the character and destiny of man. For him who is not yet acquainted with the loftier nature of Spirit, it is a sad thought that man must die, and this natural sorrow is, as it were, for him what is final. The lofty nature and destiny of Spirit, however, just consists in the fact that it is eternal and immortal.(PR, Vol. III, p. 302-4, Vol. II, p. 203)

“But this unity [of Man with God] must not be superficially conceived, as if God were only Man, and Man, without further condition, were God. Man, on the contrary, is God only in so far as he annuls the merely Natural and Limited in his Spirit and elevates himself to God.” (The Philosophy of History, Sibree, p. 324)

“According to Christianity, the individual as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love, destined as Spirit to live in absolute relationship with God himself, and to have God’s Spirit/mind dwelling in him: i.e., man is implicitly destined to su- preme freedom.” §482 zus., p. 240. Also cf. §441 zus. and Enc. §194 zus. (The Philosophy of Mind [Geist], Wallace & Miller)

The Secret to Logic and the Universe

 

Now, as your Jedi Hegel says, “Concepts are implicitly MOVEMENT” … which means that they do not stay put, that they are alive … they are all aspects, vanishing “moments” of the ONE LIVING CONCEPT. “All the words and concepts in the LOGIC refer to the CONCEPT, for that is all that exists.” This means that terms-words-concepts such as “Being” “Being-there” “Substance” “Necessity” etc, do NOT HAVE A FIXED MEANING OR DEFINITION OR DETERMINACY (horos) — if they did, they could not FLOW into other terms, and be part of the MOVEMENT, of the LIFE, of the One Living CONCEPT. They, yes, start out with a definite meaning, given to them by Verstand (or ordinary intelligence) … but this original meaning soon changes into something else — when scrutinized more closely, in fact changes into its very opposite … BEING at first is, but then flows into its opposite, NOTHING, which does likewise … this sets up a movement, a vanishing of One into the Other and vice versa, a movement which can be called, and congeals into, BECOMING, which contains Being and Nothing, but now as “moments.” So we now have (it seems) a fixed, definite and secure definition of Becoming … but not so. Indeed, the purpose of the LOGIC is to show how all categories-determinations are simply “moments,” “dancers” in a Grand Dance Movement … they do not stay or stand still, they are restless activities like the organs, cells, tissues, systems in a living Organism … thus looking at the Living Whole from a distance,  the categories  both  AREand ARE NOT — it is the same with the Logic, the Concept, the categories—the Concept’s contents or “organs” … AND THE CATEGORIES ARE NOT MEANT TO STAND STILL, REMAIN THE SAME, KEEP THE SAME FIXED DEFINITION THEY INITIALLY HAD. This is the main difficulty in understanding the Logic: everything changes, is fluid, in motion … for we are dealing here with ONE LIFE, with a LIVING BREATHING ENTITY — in fact, IT IS what your religions call GOD. So you must “forget yourself,” as Jedi Hegel and others say, when you are engaged in Logic and Science … must surrender your particularity-individuality to sheer UNIVERSALITY, take a Bath in it, you must MERGE UTTERLY with it, MERGE YOUR PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALITY with its UNIVERSALITY; and remember, Only the Universal is Necessary, not the particular or individual. Everything changes, is in motion, so beware of trying to “understand” a specific category and give it a fixed meaning — you cannot. This is the secret of SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, DIVINE THINKING, namely to think Opposites in their UNITY; so Independent and Non-Independent are the SAME, as are “Being for itself” and “Being for Another” — also “I am in and for myself (Independent or Substance) only insofar as You recognize me as in and for myself and free, that is, I am Dependent on you, on your recognition, for my Independence; I am Substance AND also POSITED, by you.”

 

“We must learn to know God as our true and essential Self … Science’s task is to trace what is objective back to the CONCEPT, which is our innermost Self.”  HEGEL

 

“For Hegel, the CONCEPT is God.” SCHELLING

 

So, the CONCEPT is a LIVING ENTITY it is GOD it is EVERY OBJECT in the Universe, the essence and inner being of all (cf., your Jacob Boehme’s writings). Therefore thereare TWO Modes of  knowing  God/the Concept/the Force, this Living Entity, and TWO ways of being Jedi EDUCATED  into  this Knowledge.   
(1) One way, the INTUITIVE, is by the “JEDI POINT CONCENTRATION METHOD” — ifyou keep doingthis eventually you will see beforeyou the Concept, as a living breathing, swirling kaleidoscopic Whole of determinacies … a sacred, holy Whole, which you begin to see “superimposed” over and indwelling every object your attention light’s upon, and every thought, etc (this is accompanied by special powers or abilities; this swirling whole also contains  the  sum  total  of all your  life’s  memories,  perceptions, experiences in condensed form, etc). BUT, you do not see the Determinacies-moments which are THERE in the  Concept, which only the Jedi Logician-Scientist sees.
(2) The other way, the DISCURSIVE, is achieved by immersing oneself in The LOGIC and the specific categories-determinacies of the CONCEPT, and eventually mastering their perfect fluid interconnection and MOVEMENT-LIFE, as a UNITY of Universality-Particularity-and Individuality.

 

 

 

HOW YOUR PHILOSOPHERS ATTAINED THE TRUTH: 2

There are THREE points to be made:

(1) The ARCHE. Philosophy’s goal is to become SCIENCE (or Knowledge). That is, “philosophy,” as the love or pursuit of Knowledge ENDS when Knowledge/Science is found—which occurred on your planet in your Modern Period. Philosophy proper began in ancient Greece, though there were stirrings in earlier periods. As your Greeks correctly defined it, “philosophy” is nothing but the search for the ARCHE—for the Truth or the Force, the eternal principle, cause and source of all things. More exactly philosophy is the Truth’s or the Force’s search for ITSELF. The Arche is ultimately THOUGHT or the UNIVERSAL as that which comprehends a multiplicity—indeed ALL THINGS—within itself.

(2) The history of philosophy begins with an OBJECTIVE ARCHE and ends with a SUBJECTIVE ARCHE. An “Objective Arche” (Force, Truth, Principle) is one that is OUTSIDE the knower, while a “Subjective Arche” is INSIDE the knower and is Consciousness or Thought itself. In your Ancient and Medieval Periods there are only OBJECTIVE Arche’s, while in your Modern Period, beginning with Descartes, a SUBJECTIVE Arche makes its appearance.

(3) Philosophy’s—Reason’s or thinking’s—primary activity and impulse, given that UNITY is the Truth, is to BRING THE MANIFOLD or the infinite multiplicity found in experience INTO UNITY and into a single SYSTEM in which all parts are interconnected and form a whole of knowledge, that is, of SELF-knowledge.

—Also, given that the goal of both Philosophy and Education is an INVERSION from the Visible to the Invisible, from the Many to the One True Reality, in our Review of your philosophies we will be looking for the teaching that CONSCIOUSNESS or THOUGHT is Reality or Being.

OVERVIEW: The Force’s or Truth’s knowledge of itself begins in your Ancient period with your Thales and Parmenides and their Objective Arche’s of “Water” and “Being”—which are Universals that bring everything into a single UNITY, and with Plato, with his Divided Line and “two worlds” distinction, and Aristotle, with the Force as “self-thinking Thought.” Then in your Medieval period the knowledge of the Force is first achieved in Religion, whose Arche however is still an “objective” one and is called “God,” with the two sides of the Force remaining separate (+|-). Then in your Modern period a Subjective Arche is discovered in Descartes’ famous MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY, namely Consciousness, and finally the “Absolute I” or Concept is uncovered by your “A-Team,” Jedi Kant-Fichte-Schelling and especially Hegel, and Jedi Science—the SELF-knowledge of the Force and the end of your planet’s History—is achieved. The purpose of the Postmodern period of your History is simply to take or educate all of your peoples into the Jedi Order and the Knowledge of the Force.

“The Whole HAD to unfold itself through the pain of History.” SCHELLING

“With Absolute Knowledge History has come to an end.” HEGEL

In essence, the history of philosophy is nothing but the progressive development and realization of the TRUTH—of Jedi Science and the Knowledge of the Force; from simple to fully elaborated. In your history of philosophy we will just be highlighting your main figures and their central ideas.

THE ANCIENT PERIOD

THALES (or the Force active in Thales’ thinking) overcomes the multiplicity and reaches Unity by his Arche “Water.” “ALL THINGS ARE WATER.” This means that (1) although the senses seem to indicate that a multiplicity of different types of things exists, in reality the many things are all forms of ONE thing, Water. Hence Reality is One, not many. (2) Hence there are two viewpoints: that of the Senses, correlated with Appearance/Illusion, and that of Reason, correlated with Reality/Truth. (3) Moreover “Water,” the Arche, what truly exists, is a UNIVERSAL, something perceived or known by Reason (thought) alone—not by the Senses, which can perceive only SINGULARS or singular items. Also Thales’ Arche is an “objective” one or a Not-I, as existing outside and other than the I, and not a “subjective” one.

Of course Thales’ discovery and doctrine that “ALL THINGS ARE WATER” was not without an intuition or direct experience of this UNITY as its foundation, similar to the one related by your Eastern Swami Vivekananda who writes: “In this state of SAMADHI all differences between ‘I’ and ‘Brahman’ [the Arche] go away, everything is reduced to unity, like the WATER of the Infinite Ocean—WATER EVERYWHERE, NOTHING ELSE EXISTS.” (RAMAKRISHNA AS WE SAW HIM, 1990, p. 70; also cf. Plato’s famous Seventh Letter).

PARMENIDES. Here the Force or One, operative within Parmenides, offers the first reasoned argument in the history of philosophy for a position or truth-claim—namely that What Is is ONE BEING. Hence Parmenides’ Arche is called “the One” or “Being.” Here again the senses lie or deceive while Reason alone reveals the Truth. His premise or principle is: “WHAT IS, IS, AND CAN ALONE BE SAID OR THOUGHT; WHAT IS NOT, IS NOT, AND CANNOT BE SAID OR THOUGHT.” In this way Parmenides proves that Reality is absolutely One and without parts and also timeless. (1) If What Is were divisible or had parts then there must exist a space, that is a “nothing,” between the parts. But by his principle, “nothing” cannot be said or thought.

“The present is the only thing that has no end.” SCHRÖDINGER

“Time is abolished with the realization of the Truth … which is the movement of the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end.” HEGEL

Thus What Is, Reality, cannot be divided into parts, hence must be absolutely ONE. (2) It also follows that there is no such thing as “time,” as the past or future. For what will be … IS NOT, hence cannot be said or thought, and must be ruled out. Likewise what was … IS NOT, hence must also be ruled out. Therefore only IS or the Present can be said or thought, hence alone IS or exists—that is, the ETERNAL Present or Now. As your Jedi Hegel says, “Eternity will not be, nor has it been. IT IS.” And as quantum physics founder Erwin Schrödinger affirms: “The present is the only thing that has no end.”

One defect of Parmenides is that he did not deduce or explain the Many, the sense-world, change, and becoming—what Plato will refer to as “the Cave.”

HOW YOUR PHILOSOPHERS ATTAINED THE TRUTH

The TRUTH, my Padawan, is the knowledge that Reality is absolutely ONE. Reality is Consciousness or Thought. Reality is a UNITY. A UNITY of Opposites in which Consciousness trumps Matter while containing Matter within itself as utterly dissolved. This One Reality is The FORCE.

HISTORY on your beautiful planet is nothing but the Truth or the Force becoming aware of itself. Thus History is nothing but the becoming of the JEDI ORDER.

There are TWO ways or forms in which Reality’s SELF-knowledge is achieved—by Philosophy/Science and by Religion/Spirituality. The former, as Thought, has DISCURSIVE or CONCEPTUAL knowledge of the Force, whereas the latter, as Consciousness, has INTUITIVE knowledge of the Force. Thought is the essence and inner core of Consciousness. Therefore, what Religion calls Consciousness (or Spirit), Philosophy calls Thought or the Concept. So, as your Jedi Hegel correctly states, “THE CONCEPT IS EVERYTHING,” or the One Absolute Reality is THOUGHT. And Thought is the UNIVERSAL (ALL-GEMEINE), which is seen and known by Reason alone, not by the Senses, and is ALL-encompassing.

The Truth, the Point, the Unity-of-opposites, the One Reality (as a dotted circle) is THERE from the very beginning of your History, although not yet known and individualized—THIS is the sole purpose of your History. The Truth knows itself first in Religion (A), as Consciousness-Intuitive, then in Philosophy-Science (B), as Thought-Discursive-Scientific, then finally by your whole planet (C), as Thought and Consciousness, the glorious JEDI ORDER fully realized.

Since time is not real, History takes place and unfolds in the ETERNAL PRESENT. Therefore the actualization of the Truth is timeless or INSTANTANEOUS.

“Religion proclaims earlier in time what Spirit (the Force) is, but only Science is its true knowledge of itself.” HEGEL

“For us believing physicists the distinction between past, present, and future is ONLY AN ILLUSION.” EINSTEIN

Philosophy/Science is the most detailed and comprehensive form of the KNOWLEDGE OF THE FORCE. So our main focus will be on your history of philosophy, which ends with Jedi Science, rather than on the history of your religions or your political states.

HISTORY IS OVER: Summary of The Jedi Handbook

THE JEDI HANDBOOK

The Jedi Handbook contains the solution to all of our planet’s problems and shows the only way to realize an incredible JEDI ORDER—a fully healed and functioning world beyond what we can possibly imagine.

The Jedi Handbook will reveal:

  • That human HISTORY is overHow it happened, and What it means.
  • That Plato, Hegel, and the JEDI philosopher/scientists on our planet have discovered the TRUTH, the Knowledge of The Force, and Jedi Absolute Science … that reveals what and whythe universe is, and who we really are.
  • That Global Jedi Education alone can heal our planet and permanently eliminate war, terrorism, greed, poverty, inequality, ignorance, nihilism, disease, and death.
  • That the real cause of the world’s problems is the immersion of the main institutions of society—science, religion, education, politics, etc.—in the Dark Side of The Force, which makes healing impossible.
  • That what currently passes for “science” is really only a subset of holistic JEDI Science. That its dark world-view and main assumptions are responsible for the nihilism, depression, and youth alienation that pervades our society and schools.
  • That today’s mainstream Religions are incapable of healing us due to their erroneous ideas about God and man—and how this can be corrected.
  • Why current education on our planet is in fact mis-education. And why the introduction ofJEDI Schools and JEDI Education is the fastest way to save our schools and release the full potential of our children.
  • Why our medical doctors and psychiatrists cannot heal us—and what can. What True Healing and Health is and the true cause and cure of all diseases, above all, the dis-ease called “Man.”
  • Why the New Age Movement is in need of major corrections if it is to realize its true ideals.

All of this and more will be revealed to be the only effective way to heal our world and realize a literal paradise on earth—the glorious “JEDI ORDER,” that will finally

“Bring BALANCE to The Force—the Universe, and Ourselves!”

Global Jedi Education will take everyone on our planet into the amazing Jedi Order by bringing BALANCE to our world’s major institutions through Jedi Science, Jedi World Religion (via Jedi Sects), Jedi Education (via Jedi Charter Schools and Universities), Jedi Businesses, a Jedi President/Prime Minister and Third Party, Jedi Doctors and Therapists, and Jedi Artists, Producers, and Media Specialists.

Thirty-five years of research, meditation, and ‘channeling’ went into The Jedi Handbook.

All of its teachings are fully evidence-based and backed by Science, philosophy, reason, quantum physics, transpersonal psychology, systems theory, our religious and spiritual traditions, and the discoveries of Einstein, Schrödinger, Goswami, Laszlo, Wolf, Haisch, Grof, Laing, Watts, Wilber, Reich, Altizer and, especially, Plato and the “A-Team,” Jedi Kant-Fichte-Schelling-and-Hegel, who brought the history of philosophy and science on our planet to completion.